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Abstract. This paper develops a general equilibrium model to analyze the link between
…nancial imbalances and …nancial crises. The model features an interbank market subject to
frictions and where two equilibria may (co-)exist. The normal times equilibrium is characterized
by a deep market with highly leveraged banks. The crisis times equilibrium is characterized by
bank deleveraging, a market run, and a liquidity trap. Crises occur when there is too much
liquidity (savings) in the economy with respect to the number of (safe) investment opportunities.
In e¤ect, the economy is shown to have a limited liquidity absorption capacity, which depends
–inter alia– on the productivity of the real sector, the ultimate borrower. I extend the model in
order to analyze the e¤ects of …nancial integration of an emerging and a developed country. I
…nd results in line with the recent literature on global imbalances. Financial integration permits
a more e¢cient allocation of savings worldwide in normal times. It also implies a current account
de…cit for the developed country. The current account de…cit makes …nancial crises more likely
when it exceeds the liquidity absorption capacity of the developed country. Thus, under some
conditions –which this paper spells out–… nancial integration of emerging countries may increase
the fragility of the international …nancial system. Implications of …nancial integration and global
imbalances in terms of output, wealth distribution, welfare, and policy interventions are also
discussed.
JEL Classi…cation Numbers: E21, F36, G01, G21
Keywords: Financial Integration, Global Imbalances, Asymmetric Information, Moral Hazard,
Financial Crisis5
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Non-Technical Summary
This paper develops a general equilibrium model that describes causal relationships between
…nancial integration, current account imbalances, and …nancial crises. Although stylized, the
model is able to account for some important features of the recent crisis, like the reversal in
leverage of market-based …nancial institutions and the sudden collapse of the wholesale …nancial
market. The …nancial market is shown to improve (in terms of e¢ciency) the allocation of liquidity
within the banking sector, and from the banking sector to the real sector. However, frictions
between lenders and borrowers impair its functioning and, in particular, it may collapse when
there is too much liquidity available compared with the number of (safe) investment opportunities.
In e¤ect, the …nancial market is shown to have a limited liquidity absorption capacity, which
depends on the productivity of the real sector, the ultimate borrower. The model boils down to
a familiar supply and demand nexus on the wholesale …nancial market. What makes this nexus
non standard is the peculiar form of the aggregate fund demand curve, which is hump shaped
due to the market frictions.
Extending the model to a two country framework, I present results in line with the recent
literature that shows that the …nancial integration of …nancially under-developed countries is
conducive to global imbalances. But I also go one step further by showing how and when such
global imbalances make the international …nancial system fragile. In normal times, …nancial
liberalization is found to increase welfare at the world level, but also to bene…t to emerging
countries and be detrimental to developed countries. Financial integration also makes …nancial
crises more likely when the degree of …nancial development in the integrated emerging countries
is too low and when capital ‡ows toward developed countries are too large. The present paper
also argues that one possible cause of the recent crisis is that the US productivity slowdown as of
2004 impaired US’ liquidity absorption capacity precisely when more foreign capital was ‡owing
in. It also shows that, when it materializes, a …nancial crisis reduces welfare in all countries.
Finally, I use the model to discuss the e¤ects of two types of policy intervention. The …rst
policy is one where central banks o¤er a deposit facility. I show that there exists a threshold
for the real deposit facility rate above which …nancial crises are ruled out. The second policy
corresponds to Basel III’s minimum liquidity coverage ratio. I show that there exists an interval
for this ratio over which …nancial crises are ruled out while the e¢ciency of the wholesale …nancial
market is preserved.6
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1 Introduction
The aim of this paper is to model the relationship between global imbalances and …nancial crises
while accounting for the following features of the recent …nancial crisis:
Feature 1 (Leveraged market-based banking sector): The crisis followed upon the rapid devel-
opment of the market-based banking sector and the surge in this sector’s leverage. Leverage of
broker-dealers increased about threefold during the six year expansion that preceded the crisis
(…gure A). As a result, broker-dealers’ total assets rose dramatically, up to 90% of US quarterly
GDP in mid-2007 (…gure B). These developments came along with the greater importance of
broker-dealers in the supply of credit to the real economy, as documented by Adrian and Shin
(2008b).
Feature 2 (External imbalances): The United States has run a persistent current account
de…cit since the early 1990s. Figure C illustrates this evolution as a ratio of world GDP. Starting
at the end of the 1990s, the counterpart of these de…cits has been mainly driven by large surpluses
in Asian emerging market economies.
Feature 3 (Domestic imbalances): The …nancial deepening process in the run-up to the recent
crisis was not accompanied with comparable changes in the real sector. On the contrary: US
labour productivity growth was positive over this period but started to slow down signi…cantly
already in 2004 (…gure D), falling from an average year-on-year growth rate of 1.65% in 2001-2004
to a year-on-year growth rate of 0.9% in 2005-2007. Kahn (2009) and Brack…eld and Oliveira-
Martins (2009) attribute this productivity slowdown mainly to the construction sector.
Feature 4 (Liquidity dry-up): The crisis materialized itself as a sudden and complete freezing
of liquidity in key …nancial markets (see, e.g., Gorton and Metrick, 2009), an abrupt deleveraging
in the market-based banking sector (…gures A and B) as well as falls in international trade (…gure
C), productivity, and aggregate output (…gure D).
The sudden change from boom to collapse has been so remarkable that one representation of
the crisis is a model with two possible equilibria, one close to a frictionless …nancial market with
an e¢cient allocation of resources, and the other characterized by a collapse in trade (Portes,
2009, Gorton, 2010). In the present paper I formalize this idea, and model …nancial fragility as
the coexistence of two self-ful…lling multiple equilibria on the wholesale …nancial market. The
model is simple and ultimately boils down to the standard nexus between aggregate supply and
aggregate demand of funds. The crucial, non standard feature of the model is the form of the
aggregate demand curve, which is hump-shaped due to market frictions. In other terms, aggregate
demand reaches a maximum for some rate of interest, re‡ecting the limited liquidity absorption
capacity of the wholesale …nancial market. The …nancial market is shown to be fragile and
subject to runs whenever the supply of funds exceeds its absorption capacity, which depends on
the productivity of the real sector, the ultimate borrower of funds.7
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Fig. C: Source: World Bank (WDI)
Fig. D: Labour productivity index normalized to one in 2005. Source: BIS and OECD (based on Bureau of Labour Statistics data).
I build the model in two steps. The …rst step consists in modelling capital ‡ows among
competitive heterogeneous banks through an interbank market. The model is static, has one
period, and involves only one country. There is a continuum of banks born with some initial
wealth. Each bank has access to a speci…c retail loan market and a speci…c and non-diversi…ed
pool of entrepreneurs. A bank may lend its resources either to entrepreneurs or to other banks on
the interbank market. This market develops because banks are heterogeneous with respect to the
probabilities that their respective pools of entrepreneurs default on retail loans. The expected
returns on retail loans depend both on these default probabilities and on aggregate productivity
in the real sector. Depending on their expected returns on retail loans, banks may choose to be
either on the demand side or the supply side of the interbank market. Basically, banks with risky
retail lending opportunities prefer to lend to other, more e¢cient banks rather than to their own
pool of entrepreneurs. In contrast, e¢cient banks prefer to borrow on the interbank market in
order to increase the size and total return of their retail loans. While the interbank market overall
improves the allocation of liquidity among banks, it is also subject to frictions that prevent the
economy from reaching the First Best allocation. Two types of frictions are considered jointly:8
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moral hazard and asymmetric information. Moral hazard arises because of limited contract
enforceability. It is assumed that borrowing banks may misuse ("divert") the funds raised on
the market, e.g. by investing into sub-prime mortgages. The net opportunity cost of diversion
depends on the degree of contract enforceability, the expected return on retail loans, and leverage.
To raise funds banks must discipline themselves by limiting their leverage (typically, banks must
"have enough skin in the game"). The moral hazard problem alone is unable to generate self-
ful…lling multiple equilibria, though. In e¤ect, what makes banks’ beliefs matter in the model
is that information is asymmetric, in the sense that lending banks do not observe borrowing
banks’ expected returns on retail loans. Although lenders do not know individual borrowers’
true quality and incentives to run away, they are able to infer the average borrower quality from
the market return. For example, in a low market return environment even ine¢cient banks may
prefer to borrow and operate on their retail loan market rather than lend on the interbank market,
and so low interest rates arouse counterparty fear. Multiple self-ful…lling equilibria arise from
lenders’ beliefs about borrowers’ quality. If lenders believe that borrowers are safe and do not
need to be incentivized –a case of low counterparty fears, then they will tolerate high leverage
and borrowers will be able to demand large loans. Aggregate demand for funds will be high,
and so will the equilibrium market return. Since high market returns keep risky bankers away
from the demand side, counterparty risk will indeed turn out to be limited. This equilibrium
is what I will refer to as a "normal time" equilibrium. It is characterized by a deep interbank
market and highly leveraged market-based banks (feature 1). In contrast, pessimistic beliefs may
also be self-ful…lling, trigger a market run, a sudden liquidity dry-up, and a deleveraging process
that are consistent with the observed developments in the …nancial sector during the recent crisis
(feature 4). Such coordination failures are only possible when real sector productivity is too low,
i.e. below what would be needed to maintain borrowers’ incentives (feature 3).
In the second step, I analyze the e¤ects of international capital ‡ows on …nancial fragility.
To do so, I extend the basic setup to a two-country framework. The two countries are identical
(i.e. they have the same size, technology, distribution of banks, etc.), except with respect to the
degree of development of their respective domestic …nancial systems. Contract enforceability is
assumed to be weaker in the less …nancially developed ("emerging") country than in the …nancially
"developed" country. In this context, …nancial integration is accompanied with positive net
capital ‡ows from the emerging to the developed country (feature 2) that improve the allocation
of savings worldwide. However, under some conditions that will be discussed, current account
imbalances are shown to generate …nancial fragility. The reason is that by exerting downward
pressures on interest rates and market returns capital ‡ows from the emerging country give
ine¢cient and risky banks incentives to borrow funds. The mere possibility that such banks may
enter the demand side of the market feeds counterparty fears and makes the …nancial market
prone to coordination failures and freezing.
Related literature. The core modelling of the …nancial market is inspired from Aghion and
Bolton (1997), where agents can choose to be borrowers or lenders. This feature is crucial in
the present model to the extent that endogenous switches of risky banks from the supply to9
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the demand side of the interbank market are the cause of sudden rises in counterparty fears
and liquidity dry-ups. The moral hazard problem builds upon Holmström and Tirole (1997),
with the di¤erence that the private bene…t from diversion is endogenous. A number of recent
papers have used the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) framework as a basis to model the interbank
transactions that arise as banks face liquidity shocks. This framework indeed proves particularly
useful to study market liquidity problems and the costly liquidation of long term assets (e.g.
Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005, Castiglionesi et al. 2010, Malherbe, 2010). Here, in contrast, the
focus is on banks’ funding liquidity problems. I do not assume idiosyncratic ex post liquidity
(preference) shocks to make the interbank market emerge. Instead this market develops ex ante
because banks’ intermediation technologies are idiosyncratic: some banks have better retail loan
opportunities than others. For this reason, the interbank market can be viewed more broadly as
a wholesale …nancial market, rather than as a short term money market. In this context, market
runs will take the form of sudden increases in margin requirements, as opposed to early fund
withdrawals.
This paper belongs to the literature that diagnoses reversals in market-based bank leverage
(or margin requirements, or haircuts) as the core mechanism behind the recent …nancial crisis and
the collapse of a number of segments of the wholesale …nancial market (e.g. repo, asset backed
commercial paper, etc.). In this recent literature leverage may reverse following an exogenous,
adverse aggregate shock when banks …nance long term assets with short term debt instruments
(i.e. when there is a maturity mismatch) and face margin requirements (Adrian and Shin, 2008a,
Geanakoplos, 2009). Here, in contrast, reversals in leverage follow upon the coordination failures
and switches from the normal to crisis times equilibria that may occur when there is too much
liquidity available in the interbank market.1 Bebchuk and Goldstein (2010) also explain sudden
funding liquidity problems by coordination failures, but they focus on the retail loan market.
Importantly, the present paper also connects the literature on leverage cycles and the collapse
of the wholesale …nancial market with that on global imbalances (Reinhart and Reinhart, 2008
; Caballero et al., 2008 ; Mendoza et al., 2009). Mendoza et al. (2009), for example, show
that …nancial integration can lead to large global imbalances when countries di¤er in the de-
gree of domestic …nancial development. However, they do not discuss the causal link between
global imbalances and …nancial fragility. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009) also analyze the
relationship between external imbalances and …nancial fragility. In their paper the de…nition of
…nancial fragility is di¤erent. It refers to the developed economy’s banks selling safe assets to
foreign investors while keeping the equity part of their domestic retail loans, which makes them
1The idea to model the crisis as a sudden regime switch is also favoured by Gorton (2010, page 20), who notes
that "a lot of macroeconomists think in terms of an ampli…cation mechanism. So you imagine that a shock hits
the economy. The question is: What magni…es that shock and makes it have a bigger e¤ect than it would otherwise
have? That way of thinking would suggest that we live in an economy where shocks hit regularly and they’re always
ampli…ed, but every once in a while, there’s a big enough shock ... So, in this way of thinking, it’s the size of the
shock that’s important. A “crisis” is a “big shock.” I don’t think that’s what we observe in the world. We don’t
see lots and lots of shocks being ampli…ed. We see a few really big events in history: the recent crisis, the Great
Depression, the panics of the 19th century. Those are more than a shock being ampli…ed. There’s something else
going on. I’d say it’s a regime switch—a dramatic change in the way the …nancial system is operating."10
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more exposed to bad exogenous domestic shocks. There is no interaction between these banks,
though, and no modelling of the interbank market. Castiglionesi et al. (2010) show that …nancial
integration makes systemic crises less likely but more extreme. Their setup is di¤erent: by allow-
ing risk sharing and cross-country liquidity insurance, …nancial integration gives banks incentives
to increase their lending and balance sheet’s maturity mismatch, which reduces banks’ resilience
to aggregate shocks. However, as they consider the …nancial integration of identical countries,
there is no current account imbalance and no discussion on the link between the …nancial inte-
gration of emerging market economies and global imbalances. The present paper shows both how
the …nancial integration of such countries generates current account imbalances and how these
imbalances make the …nancial system more fragile. Finally, Martin and Taddei (2010) recently
analyzed the e¤ects of …nancial integration on business cycles when credit markets are subject
to both moral hazard and asymmetric information. However, they do not model market freezes
and restrict their analysis to the case of a small open economy.
Outline of the paper. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the baseline one country
model. Section 3 presents the extension to two countries and discusses the e¤ects of …nancial
integration on global imbalances and …nancial fragility. Section 4 discusses some selected policy
implications, and section 5 concludes.
2 Model Setup
I consider a competitive economy populated with a mass one continuum of risk neutral agents,
who live one period from date 0 to date 1. There is one good in the economy, which agents may
consume at date 1; every unit of good consumed yields one unit of utility. For an expositional
reason that will be explained in a moment, I interpret agents as bankers. It will be convenient
to think of each banker as living on an island populated with one local, representative entrepre-
neur. Hence there is a continuum of bankers, entrepreneurs, and islands. I will index bankers,
entrepreneurs, and islands by , with  2 [01]. Every entrepreneur has one project that requires
some initial investment at date 0 but does not have any wealth at date 0 to self-…nance this
investment. In contrast, every banker is born with one unit of good as initial wealth at date 0,
which he may either store or lend to his local entrepreneur. It is assumed that a given banker
cannot lend directly to the entrepreneurs on other islands. Every unit of good stored at date 0
yields one unit of good at date 1. In the rest of the paper, I will interpret the good stored as
"cash". In contrast, bankers are heterogeneous with respect to retail loans’s expected returns, in
the sense that retail loans on island  pay o¤  unit of goods at date 1 (per unit of good lent) with
probability , and nothing with probability 1 ¡  –as described in …gure A1 in the appendix. In
the paper I will interpret  as capturing real sector’s productivity in the economy; it is invariant
across islands. There are several ways to interpret probability . It may re‡ect entrepreneur
’s idiosyncratic productivity. Or it may re‡ect banker ’s skills in monitoring and supporting
the entrepreneur’s project. The more skillful banker , the higher the probability of success of
entrepreneur ’s project. (In this latter case,  could re‡ect the quality of the bank lending11
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relationship in island .) From a technical standpoint these two interpretations are immaterial
for what will matter is that banker ’s retail loan portfolio may not yield anything at date 1 –this
assumption that banker ’s retail loan portfolio is not diversi…ed will play an important role in
the analysis. This heterogeneity creates scope for an interbank or, more generally, a wholesale
…nancial market to develop, where skillful bankers borrow from unskilled, ine¢cient bankers. For
simplicity, the s are assumed to be uniformly distributed over interval [01]. I will denote by 
the gross interest rate paid on interbank loans, and by  the expected gross return on …nancial
assets. These interest rates are endogenous. To make things interesting I assume that storage is
an ine¢cient technology, i.e.,
Assumption 1 (Productivity Parameter): 1
Because returns on retail loans are stochastic and bankers may default on their interbank debt,
 may be lower than . Moreover,  cannot be above the return on retail loans  (otherwise, there
would be no demand for funds) and  cannot be below that on storage (otherwise there would
be no supply). Hence, one has (provided that the interbank market exists): 1 6  6  6 .2 By
raising funds on the …nancial market skillful bankers are able to extend their supply of funds on
their respective retail loan markets and to increase their expected returns from retail lending. I
call such bankers "borrowers" and denote by  the amount borrowed by banker  per unit of initial
wealth. Because  is the ratio of market funding to banker’s equity, I will call it "leverage"; it is
endogenously determined and would depend on  in a frictionless world. Leverage is perfectly and
publicly observable and, therefore, contractible upon. (In other terms, each lender can observe
how much other lenders have lent to a given borrower, i.e. he can observe the borrower’s balance
sheet.) In contrast, for unskilled bankers it may be more pro…table to lend on the wholesale
…nancial market rather than use the storage technology or lend to the domestic entrepreneur. I
will call such bankers "lenders". The higher (lower) , the higher (lower) banker ’s expected
return on retail loans, and the more incline is banker  to borrow (lend) from (to) other bankers.
Therefore there will exist an endogenous cuto¤ level , above (below) which bankers borrow
(lend). This endogeneity of the distribution of lenders and borrowers is a crucial feature of the
present model.
Assumption 2 (Banker ’s Decisions): Bankers take the market return  (as well as the
market rate ) as given. Given  (and ) banker  decides whether, and how much, he borrows
or lends so as to maximize his expected pro…t.
Assumption 2 that bankers are price takers is consistent with them being atomistic and
competitive in the wholesale …nancial market. I will denote by  2f g the decision to lend (i.e.
 = ) or borrow (i.e.  = ) on the wholesale …nancial market, and by  the amount borrowed
by banker  per unit of wealth, with  > 0. I do not exclude a priori that  is a function of 
2In particular, in a frictionless world the expected returns on interbank loans depend on the s and non-arbitrage
requires they be the same across all bankers, i.e. ()= (see appendix 7.2).12
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 () ´ 1= + 1=( + ( ¡ )) (1)
with respect to his decisions  and , where 1= is a dummy equal to one if  =  and zero
otherwise. If banker  becomes a lender, then it is optimal for him to lend all his wealth, so that
his expected return is equal to . If banker  becomes a borrower on the wholesale market and
…nances his island’s entrepreneur, then his expected return is equal to ( + ( ¡ )), where
¡ is the borrower’s rent per unit of leverage. Because this rent is positive it is always optimal
for borrowers to lever as much funds as possible. In a frictionless world the most skillful banker
would be able to borrow the full amount of savings available in the economy, and the economy
would reach the First Best allocation: only the safe entrepreneur ( =1 ) would be …nanced. To
make things interesting, I assume that the wholesale …nancial market is subject to frictions that
prevent the economy from reaching the First Best. Two types of frictions are considered jointly:
moral hazard and asymmetric information. The benchmark economies when there is no friction,
when there is asymmetric information only, and when there is a moral hazard problem only are
analyzed in Appendix 7.2. As shown in this appendix, the outcomes of these economies are fairly
straightforward and none of them features multiple equilibria. Therefore, for the sake of space, I
focus on the economy with both frictions; these two frictions are described below.
Moral Hazard The moral hazard problem resembles Holmström and Tirole (1997)’s. I assume
that at date 0 borrowers have the possibility to store funds aside, run away and consume the
return on storage at date 1. I will refer to this as cash diversion. Concrete examples of such
private bene…ts would be the commissions levied by brokers on abusive mis-selling of mortgages,
credit cards, and other loan products.3 It is assumed that running away is costly and that bankers
must in this case sacri…ce a fraction of every diverted good. I model this by assuming that the
net return of cash diversion per unit of cash diverted is equal to , with
Assumption 3 (Diversion Cost Parameter): 0 6  6 1
This net return is thus lower than the return from storage in the absence of diversion, and the
overall return from diversion is  (1 + ) –the key assumption here is that the gain from diversion
increases with leverage, not that it is proportional. Following Mendoza et al. (2009), I interpret
parameter  as an indicator of the degree of enforcement of …nancial contracts and, therefore, as
an indicator of …nancial development of the economy (this point will be discussed in more details
in section 3). The lower , the more costly to divert funds ( =0corresponds to the absence
of moral hazard). The overall structure of bankers’ payo¤s is summarized in Figure A1 in the
appendix. The moral hazard problem takes place ex ante, as described in Table 1. Following
3Gerardi et al. (2010) show empirical evidence of loan mis-selling in the US prior to the recent …nancial crisis. In
the present setup, however, cash diversion will only act as an out-of-equilibrium threat and shall never materialize
itself in equilibrium.13
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diversion, borrowers do not pay their debt and lenders do not get any payment at date 1. As it
will become clear in a moment, diversion is a simple and useful shortcut to introduce a limited
borrowing capacity, as it implies that to raise funds bankers must have enough skin in the game
and limit their leverage.
Date 0:
1. Given , banker  simultaneously decides whether he stores, lends ( =) or borrows ( = )
2. Borrower  demands a quantity  of funds. Given , lenders decide whether they lend to .
3. Loan contracts are signed once aggregate supply equals aggregate demand
4. Borrower  decides whether or not he diverts the funds
Date 1:
1. If he did not divert, borrower  gets net return (1 + ) ¡  with probability ,
and nothing otherwise. If he diverted he gets  (1 + )
2. Each lender on the wholesale market gets  as return
Table 1: Time line
Asymmetric Information There is an asymmetry of information between borrowers and
lenders in the sense that the s are privately known. Lenders do not observe borrowers’ skills
and do not know every borrower’s incentive to divert cash. Since skillful bankers are unable to
distinguish themselves as skillful, they are also unable to commit themselves to behave better
than unskilled borrowers. Indeed, if lenders were to naïvely accept to lend on the basis of
borrowers’ announced skills and tolerated a higher leverage for more skillful borrowers,4 then
all borrowers would claim being skillful and obtain large loans. Obviously no lender is willing
to lend so much since in this case borrowers would divert the funds. Moreover, it is easy to
see that borrowers’ objective function (see relation (1) for  = ) does not satisfy the single-
crossing property, which would otherwise make it possible for borrowers to truthfully reveal their
types through an appropriate menu of contracts.5 Indeed, assume that borrowers face a menu
of contracts f(e )(e )g that stipulates the interest rate and the maximal leverage allowed
for borrowers claiming e . Since from borrower ’s perspective what matters for the choice of
the contract is the rent on leverage (e )( ¡ (e )) (see expression (1)), and since this rent is
independent of , borrower  would always pick the contract that yields the highest rent. In
e¤ect, this contract would be the unique (non-revealing) loan contract remaining on the market.
4It is easy to show that in the symmetric information equilibrium borrowers’ leverage increases with  – see
appendix 7.2.3.
5A menu of contracts could be revealing if, for example, for a given increase in the borrowing rate, skillful
borrowers were willing to accept a relatively lower increase in leverage than less skillful borrowers. That is, if the




=, decreased with . Since in this
case skillful borrowers would value leverage relatively more (at the margin) than unskilled borrowers, it would be
possible to design a menu of contracts that associates higher borrowing rates with higher leverage in such a way
that skillful borrowers would reveal themselves by picking the high rate contract (in such contracts, leverage would
typically be a concave function of the borrowing rate). However, from expression (1) one can see that the marginal






¡. Hence, borrowers’ objective function
does not satisfy the single-crossing property.14
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It follows that the only loan contract ( ) signed in equilibrium is identical for all borrowers.
Given the market rate  (and return ), borrowers all demand the same loan . Borrower ’s
optimization problem therefore consists in maximizing his expected pro…t (see expression (1) for
 = ) with respect to leverage  under the constraint that the expected return on retail loan is
above the expected return on wholesale loan (participation constraint), and under the constraint
that he can credibly commit himself not to divert the funds (incentive compatibility constraint).
Before I explicit borrower ’s participation and incentive compatibility constraints, one com-
ment is in order regarding the interpretation of agents as "bankers". Here agents do not perform
any of the speci…c tasks that would justify an interpretation in terms of "traditional" commercial
banking, whereby bankers are intermediaries between depositors and borrowers. For example,
they provide no payment services, perform no asset transformation, there is no delegated mon-
itoring, etc. To the extent that they borrow and lend to each other on the wholesale …nancial
market agents should rather be viewed as "market-based" intermediaries, like broker-dealers or
investment bankers. This interpretation has no material implication for the model, however, and
one could also view the agents as other non-bank …nancial …rms, large non-…nancial …rms, or any
other type of levered investors who have speci…c investment opportunities on the one hand, and
raise funds through the …nancial market on the other hand.6
2.1 Participation and Incentive Compatibility Constraints
Since technology and pro…t is linear, it is easy to see that a banker  either borrows or lends, but
never does both. When he lends it is optimal for him to lend his entire initial wealth, in which
case he gets return . It is easy to see from (1) that banker  borrows (¤ = ) if
( + ( ¡ )) >  (PC)
and lends (¤ = ) otherwise. Constraint (PC) is thus borrower ’s participation constraint. Since
bankers whose  satis…es
 >  ´

 + ( ¡ )
(2)
6Mechanism design theory establishes that deposit based banks may arise endogenously as part of an e¢cient
arrangement. Typically, as coalitions of agents banks are able to provide insurance against liquidity shocks (Dia-
mond and Dybvig, 1983), or share information (Boyd and Prescott,1986). More recently, Mattesini et al. (2010)
rationalized the existence of banks by the presence of commitment issues rather than informational frictions. The
focus of the present paper is di¤erent. First, I do not seek to explain why banks exist, and in the present setup
potential coalitions between bankers into larger and perfectly diversi…ed …nancial institutions would be ruled out by
the moral hazard problem. Second, I am primarily interested in market-based banks (as opposed to deposit-based
banks) because of their increasing importance in the economy and central role in the recent crisis, as Adrian and
Shin (2008b) have documented: "broker-dealers have traditionally played market-making and underwriting roles in
securities market. However, their importance in the supply of credit has increased dramatically in recent years with
the (...) changing nature of the …nancial system toward one based on capital market, rather than one based on the
traditional role of the bank as intermediating between depositors and borrowers." (p. 1).15
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This relation means that the risk premium  is the inverse of the average repayment probability
of the pool of borrowers, (1 + )2. Although lenders do not observe the type of each borrower,
they are able to infer the type  of the marginal borrower based on the market return  and the
market rate . No banker will be willing to lend if there exist borrowers  >  whose return from
cash diversion  (1 + ) is above both the expected return on retail lending and above the return
on …nancial assets. Borrower  knows of this in advance, and so takes care never demand too
high a loan , such that
 (1 + ) 6 maxf( + ( ¡ ))g (IC)
The above constraint can be interpreted in two di¤erent ways, re‡ecting bankers’ trade-o¤s be-
tween cash diversion and retail lending on the one hand, and between cash diversion and wholesale
lending on the other hand (see also …gure A1). It can be seen as borrowers’ incentive compatibility
constraint ( (1 + ) 6 ( + ( ¡ ))), but also as lenders’ incentive compatibility constraint
( (1 + ) 6 ), to the extent that lenders too could potentially borrow and divert funds. By
construction, the two terms inside the max operator are identical (see relation (2)). Constraint
(IC) is at the core of the present model. It requires that leverage be incentive compatible for
all borrowers, including the marginal one, and therefore guarantees that all borrowers have the
incentive to use the funds borrowed for retail lending. This may seem extreme at …rst sight
(indeed, this rules out cross-subsidization between borrowers, whereby virtuous borrowers would
pay a higher cost of funding to compensate for the losses on peccant borrowers) but it is a nec-
essary condition for the market to clear. To understand this point, consider for a moment a
situation where lenders would accept to lend to over-levered borrowers (so that constraint (IC)
does not hold). Then one would have  (1 + )  , which means that bankers would be better
o¤ borrowing and diverting the cash rather than lending to other bankers. In this case, however,
there would be no supply of funds on the wholesale market, which contradicts the fact that some
bankers lend in the …rst place. Such situation cannot be an equilibrium. Now assume that at
the market rate  all lenders accept to lend only to borrowers whose leverage satis…es constraint
(IC), except one deviating lender, who tolerates a higher leverage. In this case, all bankers would
demand a loan to this deviating lender, who would then be exposed to cash diversion, face a lower
repayment probability and, ultimately, obtain a lower expected return. In particular, because
some borrowers would divert cash, the average repayment probability of the pool of borrowers
would be less than 12 and the lender’s expected return less than 2, which is below the equi-
librium market return (see relation (3)). It follows that in equilibrium no lender has interest in
granting a loan that violates constraint (IC).7 The program of banker  consists in maximizing
7This result re‡ects the existence of strategic complementarities between lenders (see Cooper and John, 1988).
Indeed, by raising aggregate demand, an increase in leverage tolerance by all lenders except one works to increase16
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his expected pro…t with respect to  and  –see (1)– under the incentive compatibility constraint
(IC). I am now ready to de…ne an equilibrium:
De…nition 1 (Equilibrium): An equilibrium of the wholesale …nancial market is a couple
(¤ ¤) for the expected market return ¤ and leverage ¤ such that (i) ¤ is optimal given ¤
and (ii) the wholesale …nancial market clears.
I solve the equilibrium in three steps. First, I derive the optimal leverage that maximizes
borrower ’s expected pro…t under constraint (IC) and determine the type of the marginal bor-
rower . This permits me to derive the aggregate supply and demand curves (second step), and
eventually to solve for the equilibrium (third step).
2.2 Optimal Leverage and Marginal Borrower
Since it is optimal for the borrowers to demand as big a loan as possible, the incentive compati-





The positive relationship between  and  is an important feature of the present model but
at odds with standard asymmetric information models, like Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)’s, which
predicts on the contrary that borrowing constraints should be more stringent when the market
return goes up. Two important di¤erences with this type of models are worth mentioning.
First, in these models lenders usually have market power, whereas here the wholesale market is
competitive and bankers are price takers. Second, in Stiglitz and Weiss credit rationing is due to
the adverse selection of borrowers and the fact that the identity of the lenders and borrowers is
…xed exogenously. In the present model there is no adverse selection, and bankers choose on which
side of the market they operate. This choice depends on the return on …nancial assets. When 
decreases, for example, the net present value of retail loans increases and turns positive for the
lenders with the highest s. As a result, these bankers shift from the supply to the demand side of
the wholesale …nancial market and become borrowers:  goes down. The drop in  as two distinct
implications. First, new borrowers are less e¢cient than the borrowers already present in the
market and therefore the average repayment probability diminishes. This contrasts with adverse
selection models where a decrease in  would on the contrary work to improve the average quality
of borrowers. (These models assume in general a mean preserving spread distribution of returns
–or a similar mechanism, which makes the best borrowers leave the market when the interest rate
increases.) Second, the drop in  also implies that the marginal borrower’s incentive to divert
cash increases, which arouses lenders’ fear of diversion. Understanding lenders’ increasing fear
borrowers reduce their leverage in order to access the market: each of them demands a loan such
that even the least e¢cient, marginal, borrower can commit himself not to run away. Hence the
positive relationship between  and . Overall, this positive relationship results from the joint
the equilibrium market return 
¤, and therefore gives this one lender incentive to raise his leverage tolerance as
well.17
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e¤ects of moral hazard and asymmetric information. Because of the moral hazard problem lenders
put a cap on borrowers’ leverage. Because of the asymmetry of information the marginal borrower
exerts a negative externality on the whole pool of borrowers. Indeed, not only does his incentive
compatibility constraint determine his own leverage, but it also determines the leverage of all
the other borrowers. (To see this point, compare constraint (IC) with the incentive compatibility
constraint (A3) –in appendix 7.2.3– that would prevail in a symmetric information world.) Since
the marginal borrower’s tolerated leverage increases with the marginal borrower’s skills, leverage
goes down whenever new, less e¢cient bankers enter the demand side of the market or, in other
words, when  decreases (  0). This "leverage e¤ect" works to decrease the aggregate
demand for funds when market return goes down and is responsible for the hump shaped form of
the aggregate demand curve (see …gure 1). It is useful for the determination of aggregate demand
and supply to express  as a function of . Substituting  and  out of relations (2), (3), and (4),
one can characterize the marginal borrower  as follows (see appendix 7.3):
2 +(  +  ¡ 2) ¡  =0 )
2[01]
 = () ´
2 ¡  ¡  +
q




It is easy to check that 0 ()  0, which means that the number of lenders increases as market
return goes up (for  > ). Given , an increase in  increases the opportunity cost of investing
into …nancial assets, and so reduces the number of lenders   0. A rise in  has the
opposite e¤ect. By raising the incentive to divert cash, it triggers deleveraging, lowers the overall
return on retail loans, and raises the opportunity cost of borrowing; hence the rise in the number
of lenders (  0).
2.3 Aggregate Funds Supply and Demand
I am now in the position to derive the aggregate supply and demand curves. When 1, bankers
prefer storage over wholesale lending and there no supply of funds in this case. When  2 (1]
bankers  6  become lenders and aggregate supply is then equal to . When  =1bankers  6 
are indi¤erent between storage and wholesale lending, so that aggregate supply is undetermined
(but below ). Finally, when all bankers supply funds, meaning that aggregate supply is
equal to 1. Hence, aggregate supply  () takes the following form:
 ()=
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
0 if 1
2 [0(1)] if  =1
() if  2 (1]
1 if 
9
> > > > =
> > > > ;
 (6)
On the demand side, when  2 [1] bankers  >  become borrowers and borrow , so that
aggregate demand equals (1 ¡ ). When 1, the opportunity cost of borrowing is the return
on storage: aggregate demand is constant and the same as when  =1 . Finally, when 
no banker wants to be a borrower, and aggregate demand is null. Aggregate demand () can18
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In equilibrium, the aggregate demand for funds corresponds to the total amount of funds that ﬂow
from bankers with  to bankers with  > .I ti sd r i v e nb yt w oo p p o s i t ef o r c e s .O nt h eo n e
hand, all things being equal, a rise in  works to decrease the number of borrowers and, therefore,
aggregate demand for funds (0 ()  0). On the other hand, it works to increase leverage per
head (  0). These forces result in the aggregate demand curve being strictly concave
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Figure 1: Multiple self-fulﬁlling equilibria
with  =2 5 ;  =0 7
This hump shape reﬂects the limited liquidity absorption of the economy. The fact that
aggregate demand reaches a maximum for some market return 1 (see ﬁgure 1) means that
borrowers may be unable to absorb the whole supply of funds whenever it is too high. It also
reﬂects the negative externality that the marginal borrower imposes on the other, more eﬃcient
borrowers when it enters the demand side of the market. Which of the two forces prevails depends
on the prominence of this externality, which is more severe when it aﬀects many borrowers (i.e.
when  and  are low). It follows that aggregate demand increases (decreases) with  for low
(high) values of . In addition, since   0, it is easy to see that () > 0 and
() 6 0. As the incentive to divert cash increases (higher ) bankers’ borrowing capacity
8Indeed, one has 
0 ()  0, 










0 (). Hence, 
00 ()  0.M o r e o v e r ,




 0 ⇔ 1 − 
1−(1+)
0(1+) .W h e n  % 1 the left-hand side of the inequality goes to
zero, while the right-hand side is strictly positive (from (5)). In other terms the aggregate demand curve is hump
shaped when the moral hazard problem is not too benign.19
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diminishes and the retail lending activity becomes less attractive with respect to ﬁnancial assets.
In this case the supply curve shifts upward and the demand curve shifts downward. An increase
in  has the opposite eﬀect by making retail lending more attractive relative to ﬁnancial assets:
() 6 0 and () > 0. Given the above aggregate demand and supply, the market
clearing condition, which determines ∗,r e a d s
(∗)=(∗) (8)
2.4 Equilibrium
The aggregate supply and demand curves are represented in ﬁgure 1, for a case where the moral
hazard problem on the ﬁnancial market is neither too severe nor too benign (i.e. when produc-
tivity  is neither too high nor too low and  is above a certain threshold  —see proposition 1
and relation (A10) in appendix 7.4) and multiple equilibria coexist. Figure 2 illustrates two other
possible and interesting conﬁgurations. Those are represented by points −, ,a n d+.I t
is easy to see that only equilibria − and + are locally tatonnement stable, in the sense
that any small perturbation to the equilibrium price would bring the price back to equilibrium
as a result of a standard Walrasian tatonnement process.9 In contrast, equilibrium  associated
with expected return  is unstable and, as such, is of limited relevance; I will not discuss this
equilibrium further in the paper. Which equilibrium is ultimately reached depends on bankers’
beliefs about the odds that borrowers run away. Since in this paper I am only interested in
the conditions of coexistence of multiple equilibria and not in which equilibrium is ultimately
selected when − and + coexist, I will not address the issue of equilibrium selection here.
Proposition 1 below describes the conditions of existence and uniqueness of equilibria − and
+.
Proposition 1 (Equilibrium): There exist a threshold  (with 0  1) and functions b ()
and (),w i t h() > b () > 1, b 0 ()  0, 
0 ()  0 ∀ ∈ (01],a n dlim&0 ()=
lim&0 b ()=1 , such that:10
i. If  ∈ (0] then b ()=() ; If  ∈ (1] then b ()  ();
ii. Equilibrium + exists if and only if b () and equilibrium − exists if and only if
 6 ();







+ is the largest solution to (8)
and ∗
+ =( ∗









− =( 1− ).
Proof: See appendix 7.4.
9See Mas-Colell et al., 1995, section 17H, and the discussion in appendix 7.5.
10For the value of  and the explicit forms of functions () and  () see expressions (A10), (A8), and (A9) in
appendix 7.4.
11Replacing (5) into (6), (7), and (8), one gets (for  ∈ (1]): () −  () > 0 ⇔

 > () ≡
2+1
(1−2),w i t h
 = () (where () is deﬁn e di n( 5 ) ) .20
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The threshold b () in proposition 1 corresponds to the minimum level of productivity that
is necessary to reach +. Condition b () alone is not suﬃcient to guarantee that the





which case the wholesale market is subject to coordination failures. To see this point, suppose
for a moment that all bankers are pessimistic, in the sense that everyone believes that even
unskilled borrowers (who are prone to diversion) demand funds. To protect themselves against
cash diversion lenders will tolerate only low leverage, implying —all things being equal— a low
aggregate demand and a low equilibrium market return, so that even unskilled borrowers will
indeed be willing to demand funds (thereby validating bankers’ initial beliefs). The economy will
reach − (see ﬁgure 1), which I will refer to as the "crisis time" equilibrium. This situation is
akin to a market run, where every lender who believes that other lenders tolerate low leverage
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Figure 2: Productivity and ﬁnancial market equilibrium
with  =2(grey),  =3(black) ;  =0 7
In contrast, if all bankers are optimistic about counterparty risk, then the market return
will be high (∗
+  1) and justify, ex post, bankers’ optimism. The economy will then reach
+, which I will refer to as the "normal time" equilibrium. Both equilibria − and +




.N o t eh o w e v e r
that + and − never co-exist when the moral hazard problem is benign, i.e. when ,
since b ()=() in this case, and that + always exists and is unique when  =0(see the
discussion and ﬁgure A4 in appendix 7.4.1). Figure 2 completes the description of the possible
equilibria. Here productivity  varies from  =2to  =3 . High productivity  =3generates
a relatively high demand for funds with respect to the total amount of liquidity available in the
economy (here normalized to one) and results in a relatively high equilibrium market return,
which crowds ineﬃcient borrowers out of the demand side of the market. Since the remaining
borrowers have little incentive to divert cash, they do not need to be disciplined through stringent
limits on leverage. In this case the equilibrium is characterized by high market return ∗
+,h i g h
leverage ∗
+,a n da ne ﬃcient ﬁnancial market. There is no crisis. This contrasts with the case
 =2 , where in equilibrium − hardly any funds are channeled to skillful bankers.21
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Liquidity Hoarding and Liquidity Trap Equilibrium − f e a t u r e sah i g hr i s kp r e m i u m ,
deleveraging, and liquidity hoarding. At the market return ∗
− =1the total quantity of funds
available is (1+) but lenders are indiﬀerent between ﬁnancial assets and storage. Moreover, at
this market return the incentive to divert cash is so high that lenders do not tolerate a leverage
above ∗
− = 1
 − 1, for a higher leverage would not be incentive compatible. Because at this
market return the constrained aggregate demand is lower than aggregate supply, not all funds
are channelled to the wholesale ﬁnancial market (and ultimately to entrepreneurs). The quantity







− > 0,i ss t o r e du n t i ld a t e
1.12 In other terms, bankers hoard liquidity.13 In this equilibrium an exogenous increase in the
aggregate supply of liquidity would have no eﬀect on the equilibrium market return and on the
real economy. The crisis equilibrium thus presents features akin to the traditional Keynesian
liquidity trap. Moreover, the ﬁnancial system is subject to two types of ineﬃciencies. First, a
fraction of the total liquidity available in the economy is kept idle within the banking sector.
Second, retail loans also reach low  entrepreneurs, whose expected productivity is lower than
that of the entrepreneurs who would otherwise be ﬁnanced during normal times (see proposition
2iv below). The crisis equilibrium thus exhibits "zombie lending" similar to what Caballero et al.
(2008), for example, have documented in the case of Japan in the 90s. In the rest of the paper I
will refer to the existence of the crisis equilibrium as "ﬁnancial fragility" (deﬁnition 3). Section
4 will discuss how policy interventions may help avoid such undesirable outcome.
Deﬁnition 3 (Financial Fragility): The wholesale ﬁnancial market is fragile whenever the
crisis time equilibrium − exists, i.e. whenever  6 ().14
As proposition 1 suggests, the threshold () is an increasing function of . This means that
when the retail loan market is less developed then real productivity must be higher to rule out
crises. This productivity threshold corresponds to the very productivity level for which −
exists but there is no liquidity hoarding, that is (1+)=(1), and can be obtained by solving
this latter equation numerically (see also relation (A8) in appendix 7.4.2). Proposition 2 compares
t h ec r i s i st i m ea n dt h en o r m a lt i m ee q u i l i b r i a .
Proposition 2 (Comparison Between − and +):
(i) ∗
− 6 ∗











(the credit risk premium is strictly positive and lower in +)
12By deﬁnition of (),  6 () ⇔ (1
+) > (1),w h i c hm e a n st h a t
∗
− =1clears the wholesale market.
13Storage is crucial in the present model. The assumption that there exists a storage technology is a simple way
to introduce "liquidity hoarding" into the model. Another, equally important, implication is that without storage
bankers would not be able to divert liquidity in the ﬁrst place and the economy would always reach the First Best
equilibrium -see the analyzes of the benchmark economies in appendices 7.2.1 and 7.2.2.
14To my knowledge there is no universal deﬁnition of the notion of "ﬁnancial fragility". This deﬁnition somewhat
diﬀers from —but is not inconsistent with— Allen and Gale (2005)’s, who deﬁne ﬁnancial fragility as a situation
where a "small aggregate shock in the demand for liquidity leads to disproportionately large eﬀects in terms of
default or asset-price volatility" (p. 543).22
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− (the funding liquidity risk premium is strictly positive and lower in +)
(iv) ∗
− 6 ∗
+ (the banking sector is more eﬃcient in +)
Proof: See appendix 7.6.
In normal times the expected market return on ﬁnancial assets is relatively high, unskilled
bankers prefer to lend rather than borrow so that the pool of borrowers is composed of eﬃcient
bankers only. This has two consequences in terms of funding liquidity and credit risks. First,
borrowers are able to raise a large amount of funds (proposition 2i), which results in high aggregate
demand and a high equilibrium market rate ∗. The implied narrowing of the spread ∗ reﬂects
bankers’ ability to borrow against the present value of retail loans or, in Brunnermeier (2009)’s
language, the degree of funding liquidity.15 Put diﬀerently, the spread ∗ c a nb ev i e w e da s
a funding liquidity risk premium. Driven by lenders’ fear that borrowers divert the cash, this
premium is lower in normal times (proposition 2iii) when only skillful bankers raise funds (i.e.
when  is high —see relation (A11) in appendix for a formal proof). Second, a high expected
market return on ﬁnancial assets has also a negative eﬀect on credit risk since, conditional on not
diverting, borrowers are less likely to default. Hence the credit risk premium ∗∗ too is lower
in + than in − (proposition 2ii). Overall, the interest rate spread on retail loans ∗ is
the (geometric) sum of a credit risk premium ∗∗, due to the risk that entrepreneurs default,
and a funding liquidity risk premium ∗, due to the risk that borrowers divert the funds.
Financial Market Depth and Funding Liquidity In the literature more is known about the
relationship between ﬁnancial market depth and market liquidity -i.e., the ease with which assets
are traded, than about the relationship between market depth and funding liquidity. Pagano
(1986), for example, develops a model where market liquidity is positively related to the size of the
ﬁnancial market and "trading volume and absorptive capacity of the market tend to feed positively
on each other: more traders make more active trade, and vice versa" (p. 256). In contrast, as
in Bebchuck and Goldstein (2010), proposition 2 suggests there is a positive correlation between
the volume of trade (point i) and funding liquidity (point iii) since both increase from crisis to
normal times. I complete the description of the equilibrium with the comparative statics analysis
of variations in the two parameters of the model  and  (see proposition 3).







































Proof: See appendix 7.7.
15Brunnermeier (2009, p. 91): "Funding liquidity, the ease with which expert investors and arbitrageurs can
obtain funding, is distinct from market liquidity. Funding liquidity is high –and markets are said to be “awash
with liquidity”– when it is easy to borrow money, either uncollateralized or with assets as collateral".23
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As the partial derivatives of (5) with respect to  and  suggest, an increase in  has opposite
eﬀects on ∗
+. On the one hand, given  higher returns on retail loans attract bankers to the
demand side of the interbank market (  0). On the other hand, the rise in  also relaxes
the borrowing constraint (see (IC)), which generates a higher demand for fund per borrower
(∗
+ increases), a higher aggregate demand, a higher equilibrium market return (∗
+ goes up),
and works to reduce the number of borrowers (  0). Proposition 3i shows that this second
eﬀect prevails (i.e. ∗
+ ultimately goes up) and that in normal times a rise in  implies fewer
but more leveraged borrowers on the interbank market (proposition 3i). (I.e. it improves the
eﬃciency of the banking sector). The intuition is that the least eﬃcient borrowers ultimately
prefer to become lenders in order to reap beneﬁts from the most eﬃcient bankers’ productivity
gains. The eﬀect of  on ∗
+ is subject to a similar, albeit opposite, trade-oﬀ.G i v e n,ah i g h e r
 increases borrowers’ incentive to divert funds and diminishes lenders’ leverage tolerance (∗
+
goes down), which by reducing the return on retail loans also reduces the number of borrowers
(  0). As the aggregate demand for funds diminishes, however, so does ∗
+,w h i c hw o r k s
to reduce the number of lenders. Again, this latter eﬀect dominates and ultimately ∗
+ goes
down. In crisis times, in contrast, the market only adjusts through bankers’ liquidity hoarding
behavior, not through market return, which is constant (proposition 3ii). Hence the above trade-
oﬀ does not exist and only the direct eﬀects of  and  on borrowers’ incentives are at work.
It follows that increases in  and  have negative and positive eﬀects on ∗
−, respectively
(proposition 3ii).
3 Financial Integration, Imbalances, and Fragility
As sections 2.3 and 2.4 suggest the model ultimately boils down to a familiar supply and demand
nexus. What makes this nexus non standard is the peculiar form of the fund demand curve, which
ﬁnancial frictions constrain and distort into a hump shape. (Figure A2 in the appendix shows
that the demand curve would be monotonically decreasing in the market return in the absence
of asymmetric information.) From a graphical perspective, the robustness of the ﬁnancial system
depends on where the supply curve stands with respect to the demand curve (see ﬁgure 2). Any
exogenous upward shift in the supply curve makes the ﬁnancial system closer to fragility. As
many policy makers and academics (e.g. Bernanke, 2005, 2007, Caballero et al., 2008) have
pointed out, one important cause of excess liquidity in developed countries (notably the US) in
the run up to the recent crisis was the global saving glut and incapacity of the domestic banking
sectors in emerging market economies (notably Asia excluding Japan) to generate ﬁnancial assets
from domestic real investments, as well as their propensity to instead invest domestic savings into
developed countries’ ﬁnancial assets. The purpose of this section is to model this phenomenon as
an upward shift in the fund supply curve on the interbank market. To do so I now consider a two-
country (or -region) model. The two countries have the same features as the economy described
so far: each of them is populated with a continuum of bankers, entrepreneurs, and islands, has
the same productivity and storage technology, etc. However, following Mendoza et al. (2009),24
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1317
April 2011
one country is assumed ﬁnancially "developed", with  = , while the other is "emerging",
with  =  and  > . This latter inequality means that bankers have more incentives to
divert funds in the emerging country than in the developed country. This is the only feature that
diﬀerentiates the two countries, which I index by  =  (for "emerging"),  (for "developed").
The country of origin of a given banker is perfectly observable. I ﬁrst described in section 3.1 the
current account imbalances that arise following the ﬁnancial integration of the two countries. In
section 3.2 I discuss the conditions under which these imbalances generate ﬁnancial fragility, and
in section 3.3 I discuss the implications of ﬁnancial integration in terms of output and welfare.
3.1 Current Account Imbalances
In autarky, bankers located in country  trade with each other through country ’s domestic
wholesale ﬁnancial market. There are two distinct interbank markets, and for each of them the
equilibrium is characterized as in proposition 1, for  = . The interbank market of country
 is characterized by a higher expected return (∗
  ∗





) —from propositions 2 and 3. After ﬁnancial integration
bankers from the two countries trade with each other through the international wholesale ﬁnan-
cial market. Since the international fund demand (supply) is equal to the sum of the domestic
demands (supplies), the fund demand (supply) curve on the integrated market is also hump
shaped (monotonically increasing). In equilibrium the international expected market return ∗
clears the integrated ﬁnancial market
(∗)+(∗)=(∗)+(∗) (9)
where the aggregate supply and demand of funds by bankers in country , () and (),a r e
deﬁned in (6) and (7) for  = . Capital is assumed to ﬂow freely across countries. In eﬀect,
it goes from the emerging (where expected returns on ﬁnancial assets are originally lower) to
the developed country until market returns are equalized. Figure 3 depicts the current account
balance of country  as the diﬀerence between domestic savings and domestic investment, i.e.
(∗)−(∗), in percentage of country ’s domestic output for various values of  (see section
3.3 below for the deﬁnition of output). It appears as a function of  that decreases with 
in + (plain line curve), is constant in − (dashed horizontal line), and is surjective when
both − and + coexist. In normal times, the current account deﬁcit widens as  increases
because the incentives to divert funds are stronger and counterparty risks higher in this case,
which leads lenders from country  to further invest into country . Borrowers in country  are
also able to raise more funds than those in country  (∗
  ∗
 —see relation (4)). As a result, the
rent on leverage is higher in country  and, all things being equal (in particular given that the
productivity level and market return are the same in both countries), there are more borrowers
in this country than in country  (∗
  ∗
 —see relation (5)). As  goes up, the ﬂow of funds
from  to  intensiﬁes and leverage in country ’s banking sector as a whole increases. More
precisely, leverage decreases at the bank level (i.e. goes  down) but increases at the banking
sector’s level (i.e. (1 − ) goes up), which is consistent with feature 1 in the Introduction.25
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Developed country's liquidity absorption capacity
Figure 3: Developed country’s current account balance
(∗) − (∗) in + (plain line) and − (dashed line)
with  =3 ,  =0 7,a n d > 07
Given country ’s limited liquidity absorption capacity, however, it may be that ﬁnancial
integration makes the international ﬁnancial system more fragile. As ﬁgure 3 shows, there is
indeed a threshold for  (represented by the dotted vertical line) above which capital ﬂows from
the emerging country are so large that even ineﬃcient bankers may enter the demand side of
the ﬁnancial market. If lenders believe that risky bankers are on the other side of the market,
then they may run oﬀ the market and trigger a crisis. During a crisis international trade collapse
and country ’s deﬁcit is smaller than in normal times due to bankers hoarding liquidity. (In
percentage of country ’s output, the current account deﬁcit may be larger in the crisis time
equilibrium for some low  since output is also lower in this case —ﬁgure 5a illustrates this latter
point.) In eﬀect, the developed economy is only able to cope with a limited current account
deﬁcit without any threat to the ﬁnancial sector. For example, for  =3this limit is at about
1.4% of country ’s GDP, which corresponds to the intersection of the plain line curve with the
vertical dotted line in ﬁgure 3. Any increase in the current account deﬁcit above this capacity
gives rise to multiple equilibria with the possibility of coordination failures onto the crisis time
equilibrium. The relationship between ﬁnancial integration and ﬁnancial fragility is discussed in
more details next section.
3.2 Financial Fragility
Figure 4 reports the minimum level of productivity () that is required to rule out the ﬁnancial
crisis equilibrium (see deﬁnition 3), for various degrees of ﬁnancial development  in the emerging
country, with  > , in autarky and under ﬁnancial integration. Under ﬁnancial integration,
() is computed in a similar way as in the previous section, i.e. it is obtained by solving
equation (1+)+(1+)=(1)+(1) numerically with respect to .T h eﬁnancial system is
fragile in country  when  6 . The lower dotted line corresponds to the productivity threshold
 for the developed country in autarky when  =0 7. It is constant because in autarky the26
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Figure 4: Minimum productivity  for various values of 
before (dotted lines) and after (plain line) ﬁnancial integration
with  =0 7 and  > 07
The upper dotted line corresponds to the productivity threshold  () for the emerging
country in autarky for various values of  above 07. It increases monotonically with  (from
proposition 1, 
0
 ()  0). It is easy to see that the emerging (developed) country in autarky has
the most (least) fragile ﬁnancial system. Finally, the plain line curve in the middle corresponds
to the case of full ﬁnancial integration (). Productivity thresholds under autarky and
ﬁnancial integration are identical when  =  =0 7, which basically means that —all other
things being equal— ﬁnancial integration of equally developed countries has no eﬀect on ﬁnancial
fragility. This is intuitive, since in this case ﬁnancial integration does not imply any net capital
ﬂow or imbalance across countries. In fact, in the present model, ﬁnancial integration only matters
when it involves countries with diﬀerent degrees of development.16 As they ﬂow to country ,
country ’s savings exert downward pressures on the wholesale market expected return, which is
conducive to market runs. Financial integration raises the minimum productivity level required
in country  to rule out such runs and, given , makes country ’s ﬁnancial sector more fragile.
This result is illustrated by the fact that the plain line curve increases with respect to  (i.e.

0
1 ()  0). For  =3(see the horizontal dotted line in ﬁgure 4), for example, the crisis
time equilibrium exists whenever  is above the threshold represented by the vertical dashed
line: whenever   074 the wholesale market is fragile. (Note that, by construction, this
threshold is the same as in ﬁgure 3.) One important conclusion of this section is therefore
that ﬁnancial integration of emerging countries jeopardizes the ﬁnancial system if the degree of
ﬁnancial development of these countries is too low given the level of productivity in the real
sector. Implications in terms of output and welfare are discussed below.
16Things would be diﬀerent if I assumed ex post idiosyncratic shocks and risk aversion, in which case ﬁnancial
integration of ex ante identical countries would have risk sharing and liquidity insurance eﬀects, as in Castiglionesi
et al. (2010). Instead, the focus here is on wealth re-allocation and eﬃciency eﬀects of ﬁnancial integration.27
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3.3 Aggregate Output and Welfare
Since entrepreneurs do not make any proﬁt welfare in country  ()i sd e ﬁned as the sum of




























Welfare and output for various degrees of ﬁnancial development  are reported in ﬁgure 5. The
plain lines correspond to full ﬁnancial integration and the dotted lines correspond to autarky. To
ﬁx ideas, the model is parameterized so that the ﬁnancial system is not fragile in country  in
autarky, i.e. − does not exist. (I use  =3 ,  =0 7 and  > 07.) In this case, country
 has unique and constant levels of output and welfare. In country , in contrast, equilibrium
+ is unique only for low values of , does not exist for values of  close to one, and coexists
with − for intermediate values of . In all cases, welfare and output are lower, and the
ﬁnancial system is more fragile in country  than in country . Financial integration has two
main eﬀects. First, as discussed in the previous section, since the emerging country may export
ﬁnancial fragility to the developed country, ﬁnancial integration reduces world aggregate welfare
and output in the case a ﬁnancial crisis materializes. Second, in normal times ﬁnancial integration
raises both output and welfare at the world level because resources are overall more eﬃciently
used. However, it also induces a redistribution of wealth and welfare both within and across
countries. Typically, output augments in the developed country thanks to higher investments
but diminishes in the emerging country (ﬁgures 5a and 5b). Perhaps more surprising is the
result that welfare is redistributed the other way around (ﬁgures 5c and 5d). The change in the
equilibrium interest rate is detrimental to borrowers and beneﬁcial to lenders in the emerging
country (where the interest rate increases), whereas it is detrimental to lenders and beneﬁcial to
borrowers in the developed country (where the interest rate decreases). In the emerging country,
welfare tends to diminish because of borrowers’ welfare losses, but these losses are more than
oﬀset (i) by the welfare gains induced by the relaxation of borrowers’ borrowing constraint (i.e.
t h er i s ei n∗
), (ii) by lenders’ welfare gains (rise in ∗
), and (iii) by the fact that the proportion
of lenders (∗
) increases. Thus, overall domestic welfare increases (ﬁgure 5d). Symmetrically,
in the developed country lenders are worse oﬀ and the tightening of the borrowing constraint
(decrease in ∗
) partially oﬀsets borrowers’ net gains from the lower borrowing rate. Moreover,
a disproportionate share of the output gains generated in country  ultimately accrue to the
lenders from country , so that overall welfare diminishes (ﬁgure 5c). Financial liberalization
thus beneﬁts to the emerging country and is detrimental to the developed country.28
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c. Welfare in country  () d. Welfare in country  ()
Figure 5: Domestic output and welfare before (dotted) and after (plain) ﬁnancial integration
with  =3 ,  =0 7 and  > 07
These predictions are opposite to Ju and Wei (2010) and Mendoza et al. (2007). The latter
present a model where welfare redistribution eﬀects induced by the change in the interest rate
are much stronger than the wealth eﬀects. The reason is that in their setup agents have concave
utility and the borrowers are the poorest agents (i.e. with the highest marginal utility of con-
sumption), who want to borrow in order to smooth their consumption. In this context, in the
emerging country the redistribution from borrowers to lenders reduces domestic welfare, while in
the developed country the redistribution from lenders to borrowers increases it.
4 Policy Implications
This section discusses the eﬀects of two types of policy intervention capable of preserving ﬁnancial
stability when liquidity is abundant. The ﬁrst policy consists of central banks providing a deposit
facility and committing to remunerate deposits at a (real) rate . As will become clear in an in-
stant, this policy has a fairly straightforward implication. The second policy is a micro-prudential
policy that consists in a ﬁnancial regulator requiring bankers to hold a minimum amount of cash,
i.e. to comply with a minimum liquidity coverage ratio (LCR).29
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4.1 Central Bank Deposit Facility
Assume that the central banks of the two countries provide deposit facilities at the same deposit
rate  > 1. With this latter condition central bank deposits henceforth replace bankers’ storage
technology as outside option. It is easy to see from ﬁgure 1 that there exists a certain threshold
for  above which the crisis equilibrium is ruled out. Indeed, by remunerating deposits at a high
enough rate, in fact for  ,( w h e r e is the smallest solution to (9)) the central bank makes
sure that ineﬃcient bankers are never willing raise funds on the interbank market. Put diﬀerently,
it is able to coordinate bankers’ expectations o n t ot h en o r m a lt i m ee q u i l i b r i u m . N o t et h a ti n
equilibrium the central bank will not take any deposit, though, as all lenders will prefer to go
to the wholesale market. It is therefore enough for the central bank to commit to remunerate
deposits at rate   in order to coordinate expectations and avoid ﬁnancial crises. Such
policy, however, can only help when the moral hazard problem is not too severe and the normal
time equilibrium exists, i.e. when b (). Interestingly, the above predictions of the model
contradict Bebchuk and Goldstein (2010)’s. In their model a rise in the central bank deposit rate
raises the opportunity cost of lending to entrepreneurs, which leads banks to exit the retail loan
market and ultimately works to increase entrepreneurs’ funding liquidity risks. Here, an increase
in the central bank deposit rate also increases the opportunity cost of lending to entrepreneurs.
However, as long as the deposit rate is not too high (i.e. for  6 ∗
+), this has the virtuous
eﬀect to limit zombie lending, to keep the least eﬃcient bankers away from the demand side of
the interbank market, and to mitigate counterparty fears. As a result, interest rate spikes reduce






the interbank market would shrink and some bankers would deposit funds with
the central banks, while for  >  the interbank market would vanish.)
4.2 Liquidity Coverage Ratio
The minimum LCR designed in Basel III identiﬁes the amount of liquid assets a bank must
hold that can be used to oﬀset the net cash outﬂows it may encounter under stress. The most
liquid assets include cash and marketable securities from sovereigns or central banks (see Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision, 2009). Retail loans and other banking book assets are
considered as the most illiquid assets. The aim of the LCR is to ensure that the bank holds
enough liquid assets to repay its short term wholesale debts and, more generally, short term
ﬁnancing subject to funding liquidity risk. The main beneﬁt of such a policy is to reduce funding
liquidity risk and ensure that the bank is able to roll over its short term debt. The cost is that
it diverts the bank from ﬁnancing the real sector and hinders entrepreneurs’ investments. The
present model lends itself particularly well to the analysis of this trade-oﬀ b e c a u s ei tf e a t u r e s
both the assets and liabilities items Basel III’s LCR is based on, namely: cash (i.e. storage) and
wholesale debt that is subject to funding liquidity risk. Let  ∈ [01] be the minimum (liquidity
coverage) ratio of cash to wholesale market debt bankers are required to hold, so that borrowers
must store at least  goods as cash if they want to raise  on the wholesale market. This cash is30
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assumed non-divertible, for example because it is escrowed with the central bank (e.g. reserves)
or other third party. Hence a borrower’s balance sheet at date 0 is structured as follows:
A Borrower balance sheet L
(Retail loans) 1+ −   (Interbank loan)
(Cash holding)  1 (Endowment)
To facilitate the discussion, parameter  is assumed to be the same in the emerging as in
the developed country. While the LCR reduces the quantity of funds that can be diverted, it is
ineﬃcient from the banker’s viewpoint for it reduces the quantity of funds channelled to the real
sector. It is therefore optimal to keep cash holding to the minimum and lend as much as possible,
i.e. 1+ − , to entrepreneurs. Banker  thus maximizes his expected proﬁt
max
∈{}
 () ≡ 1= + 1=((1 + ) − ( − 1) − ) (12)
where  − 1 is the opportunity cost of holding cash. With probability  retail loans are paid
back and borrower ’s net gain is the sum of returns on both retail loans and storage minus debt
repayments. With probability 1 −  retail loans are not paid back and borrower ’s gross return
is that on storage, .S i n c e1  , the return on storage is insuﬃcient to pay the entire debt
and borrower  gets nothing in net terms in this case. Note that because the banker must hold
cash proportional to his wholesale market debt and cash holding is ineﬃcient, the rent on leverage
may not always cover the cost of wholesale debt. In particular, when  is above ( − )( − 1)
the expected proﬁt decreases in , which implies that the interbank market does not exists.
Too high a liquidity coverage ratio kills the wholesale ﬁnancial market. For simplicity, in the
analysis below I will derive the solution of maximization problem (12) under the conjecture that
 6 ( − ∗)( − 1) —bearing in mind that the solution shall hold only when this conjecture is
true in equilibrium (this corresponds to situations (A) and (B) in ﬁgure 6 below). The model is
solved in a similar way as the basic model. To keep notation simple, in what follows I drop the
country indice  =  for country-speciﬁcv a r i a b l e s, , , domestic aggregate demand and
supply  () and  (), and parameter . Bankers’ incentive compatibility constraint (IC) now
writes
 (1 +  − ) 6 max{((1 +  − ) +  − )} (IC)
where, as before, the term on the left-hand side corresponds to the private beneﬁt of the borrower
when he misuses the funds (e.g. makes sub-prime retail loans). Banker  is willing to borrow on
the wholesale market if and only if
((1 + ) − ( − 1) − ) >  (PC)
which implies the marginal borrower is
 ≡

(1 + ) − ( − 1) − 
 (2)31
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 (1 − )
(4)
This result simply restates that borrowers have less funds to misuse when they hold cash and
that by mitigating the moral hazard problem LCR works to relax bankers’ borrowing constraint.
Notice also that the above relations are identical to relations (IC), (PC), (2), (3), and (4) when
 =0 , respectively. It is easy to re-arrange these equations in order to express  as a function
 (),17 as well as the aggregate country supply and demand:
 ()=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0 if 1
∈ [0  (1)] if  =1
 () if  ∈ (1]
1 if 
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬























Again, the equilibrium market return ∗ is the highest return that solves the market clearing
condition (9), under the condition that ( − ∗)( − 1) in equilibrium. When this condition
is not satisﬁed, then ∗ =0and there is no wholesale ﬁnancial market: bankers with 1
store their wealth, and all bankers with  > 1 lend to their pool of entrepreneurs. I am now
in the position to solve the model for various values of  ∈ (01). The purpose of this exercise
is to discuss the eﬀects of LCR on welfare and output in the developed country, as well as on
the fragility of the international ﬁnancial system. To do so I start from a situation where in
the absence of LCR ( =0 )b o t h− and + coexist and gradually raise  up to one. I set
parameters to  =3 ,  =0 7 and  =0 8.( I t i s e a s y t o s e e f r o m ﬁgures 4 and 5 that in
this case − and + coexist when  =0 .) For the results see ﬁgure 6, which describes three
diﬀerent situations. Situation (A) is one where  is too low to rule out ﬁnancial crises. In normal
times, any marginal increase in the LCR reduces aggregate output as less funds are channelled to
productive projects, without making the ﬁnancial system more robust. In crises times, the rise
in LCR gradually reduces funding liquidity risk, which allows for an increase in leverage and the
reduction of the excess supply of funds, hence the rise in output in this case. Figure 6 suggests
that there exists a threshold for  above which the moral hazard problem recedes and equilibrium
− is ruled out. This corresponds to situation (B). In this case the most eﬃcient borrowers are
able to leverage and demand enough funds so as to keep aggregate demand and market return
high enough to maintain ineﬃcient bankers on the supply side of the interbank market.

















 − (1 − )=0 .32
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a. Output in country  () b. Welfare in country  ()
Figure 6: Domestic output and welfare for various values of  ∈ (01)
with  =3 ,  =0 7 and  =0 8
Finally, situation (C) is one where borrowers are able to raise even more funds, but are
u n w i l l i n gt od os ob e c a u s et h e yw o u l dt h e nh a v et o hold too much cash against wholesale debt,
which is not proﬁtable. That is, under the initial conjecture that borrowers demand as much
funds as possible one would obtain ( − ∗)( − 1) in equilibrium, which contradicts the
initial conjecture. Hence, there is no wholesale ﬁnancial market in such case. Overall, this exercise
suggests that there is an interval for the liquidity coverage ratio over which ﬁnancial crises are
ruled out while market eﬃciency is preserved.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper develops a general equilibrium model that describes causal relationships between
ﬁnancial integration, current account imbalances, and ﬁnancial crises. Although stylized, the
model is able to account for some important features of the recent crisis, like the reversal in
leverage of market-based ﬁnancial institutions and the sudden collapse of the wholesale ﬁnancial
market. The ﬁnancial market is shown to improve (in terms of eﬃciency) the allocation of liquidity
within the banking sector, and from the banking sector to the real sector. However, frictions
between lenders and borrowers impair its functioning and, in particular, it may collapse when
there is too much liquidity available compared with the number of (safe) investment opportunities.
In eﬀect, the ﬁnancial market is shown to have a limited liquidity absorption capacity, which
depends on the productivity of the real sector, the ultimate borrower. The model boils down to
a familiar supply and demand nexus on the wholesale ﬁnancial market. What makes this nexus
non standard is the peculiar form of the aggregate fund demand curve, which is hump shaped
due to the market frictions.
Extending the model to a two country framework, I present results in line with the recent
literature that shows that the ﬁnancial integration of ﬁnancially under-developed countries is
conducive to global imbalances. But I also go one step further by showing how and when such
global imbalances make the international ﬁnancial system fragile. In normal times, ﬁnancial
liberalization is found to increase welfare at the world level, but also to beneﬁtt oe m e r g i n g33
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countries and be detrimental to developed countries. Financial integration also makes ﬁnancial
crises more likely when the degree of ﬁnancial development in the integrated emerging countries
is too low and when capital ﬂows toward developed countries are too large. The present paper
also argues that one possible cause of the recent crisis is that the US productivity slowdown as of
2004 impaired US’ liquidity absorption capacity precisely when more foreign capital was ﬂowing
in. It also shows that, when it materializes, a ﬁnancial crisis reduces welfare in all countries.
Finally, I use the model to discuss the eﬀects of two types of policy intervention. The ﬁrst
policy is one where central banks oﬀer a deposit facility. I show that there exists a threshold
for the real deposit facility rate above which ﬁnancial crises are ruled out. The second policy
corresponds to Basel III’s minimum liquidity coverage ratio. I show that there exists an interval
for this ratio over which ﬁnancial crises are ruled out while the eﬃciency of the wholesale ﬁnancial
market is preserved.
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In this section I describe the First Best equilibrium of the wholesale ﬁnancial market in the absence
of friction (i.e. perfect information and no cash diversion), as well as the equilibria when the s
are private information and cash diversion is not possible, and when cash diversion is possible
but information is symmetric. Here I show that none of these benchmark cases exhibits multiple
equilibria and, therefore, that both moral hazard and asymmetric information are necessary to
obtain ﬁnancial fragility (as deﬁned in deﬁnition 3).
7.2.1 Frictionless Economy
Let  be the marginal banker, who is indiﬀerent between borrowing and lending with, by deﬁn-
ition:  ≡ ( + ( − )).G i v e n ,b o r r o w e r (∀ > ) maximizes his expected proﬁt( 1 )
with respect to , and it is optimal for him to demand an inﬁnite quantity of funds ( → +∞)
when  . As a result, the aggregate demand for funds is ﬁnite if and only if  = ,w h i c hi s
therefore the condition for the ﬁnancial market to clear. At this rate, the most eﬃcient banker
 =1is the only banker willing to borrow. Since this banker never defaults, ∗ = , and since
∗  1 liquidity hoarding is never a viable option for bankers, who prefer to lend on the market.
In equilibrium there is no spread (i) between the interest rates on the retail and the bond mar-
kets (∗ = ) or (ii) between the interest rate and the return on ﬁnancial assets (∗ = ∗). This
absence of spread reﬂects the full eﬃciency of the ﬁnancial market. The economy reaches the
ﬁr s tb e s te q u i l i b r i u m(∗(∗)) = (1), which I represented by point  in ﬁgure A2. Note
that this ﬁrst best corresponds to the equilibrium that would prevail in an economy where wealth
w o u l db el o c a t e di nt h em o s te ﬃcient island only. (Put diﬀerently, the distribution of liquidity at
date 0 does not matter.) Moreover, competition among bankers implies that the (only) borrower
on the market does not draw any beneﬁt from leverage, and proﬁts in the ﬁnancial sector are
uniformly distributed across bankers (they all have the same proﬁt ).37
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7.2.2 Economy with Asymmetric Information Only
Under asymmetric information all bankers have access to the same borrowing rate  and banker
 =1demands an inﬁnite quantity of funds so long  . In this case the equilibrium is unique
and requires that ∗ = , which implies that only the most skillful banker borrows funds on the
wholesale ﬁnancial market. In other terms, this equilibrium is perfectly revealing. The economy
reaches the First Best equilibrium even though the s are private information.
7.2.3 Economy with Moral Hazard Only
As in the text, I solve the equilibrium in three steps. After having explicited bankers’ participation
and incentive compatibility constraints, I derive the optimal leverage that maximizes bankers’
expected proﬁt under these constraints and determine the type of the marginal borrower .T h i s
permits me to derive the aggregate supply and demand curves (second step), and eventually solve
for the equilibrium (third step).
Participation and Incentive Compatibility Constraints In equilibrium the expected re-
turn  must be the same across borrowers; otherwise, all lenders would be willing to lend to the
borrower with the highest expected return, and the market would not clear. Hence, the interest











Banker  will become borrower only if the participation constraint (PC) is satisﬁed, that is if
 > . Because lenders observe the st h e yh a v et h ea b i l i t yt od e t e rc a s hd i v e r s i o nb yd e n y i n g
loans to over-levered borrowers. Therefore, leverage  depends on the sa n di ss p e c i ﬁct oe a c h
banker: no banker will be willing to grant a loan to borrower  if ’s return from cash diversion
 (1 + ) is above both his expected return from retail lending, ( + ( − )), and the return
on wholesale lending, .B a n k e r knows of this in advance, and so takes care never demand too
high a loan , such that (∀ ∈ [01])18
 (1 + ) 6 max{( + ( − ))} (A3)
The above constraint is borrower ’s incentive compatibility constraint and determines ’s bor-
rowing capacity.
18The max term on the right hand side emphazises that even low  bankers have the option to demand a loan
and then divert the cash. To keep notation light, I do not explicitly write  as a function of  but, of course,
 = () is borrower-speciﬁc.38
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Optimal Leverage and Marginal Borrower The program of borrower  >  consists in
maximizing his expected proﬁt( 1 )f o r = ) under constraint (A3). Using relations (A1) and
(A2) one can re-write ’s incentive compatibility constraint as ( +  − ) 6 −. Because
this constraint would always be satisﬁed for borrower  % 1 and aggregate demand would be
inﬁnite when  +  , in equilibrium one necessarily has  +  .F o r b o r r o w e r ,i ti s
therefore optimal to demand funds as long as the loan is incentive compatible. Thus, constraint
(A3) binds and ’s loan demand is equal to
∗ ()=
 − 
 +  − 
 (A4)
Relation (A4) shows that leverage increases with banker’s eﬃciency and productivity:   0
and   0. It also decreases with the market return:   0 because, all things being
equal, a rise in the return required by the market increases the cost of debt and, therefore, the
incentive to divert cash. Following a rise in ,  must diminish to maintain incentives.
Aggregate Funds Supply and Demand I am now in the position to derive the aggregate
demand and supply curves. When 1 bankers prefer to consume early than to lend, and so
the aggregate supply of funds is equal to zero. When 1,b a n k e r s ∈ [0) prefer to lend
their unit of wealth rather consume early, while the rest of the bankers prefer to borrow. When
 =1bankers  6  are indiﬀerent between early and late consumption, and so the aggregate
supply is undetermined (but below ). Finally, when all bankers supply funds (i.e.  =1 )




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0 if 1
∈ [0(1)] if  =1
() if  ∈ (1]
1 if 
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
 (A5)
On the demand side, when  ∈ [ − ] bankers  >  become borrowers and borrow (),
so that aggregate demand equals
Z 1
()
(). As discussed above, when − the most
skillful banker ( =1 )i sn o tﬁnancially constrained and aggregate demand is inﬁnite. Finally,
when no banker wants to be a borrower, and aggregate demand is null. The aggregate
demand () can therefore be expressed as20
()=
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
+∞ if − 
Z 1
()
() if  ∈ [ − ]
0 if 
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
 (A6)
where () and () are deﬁned in (A4) and (A2), respectively. Noticing that ∗ =1when
 & 1 and that ∗ increases with , it is easy to see that the equilibrium market return ∗ is
always above 1. Hence, there will be no liquidity hoarding in this economy.
19One has ()=

 for  ∈ [1 − ].









− 1 for  ∈ [ − ].39
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Proposition A1 (Equilibrium): There exists one unique equilibrium characterized by the
market return ∗ and leverage schedule {∗ (∗)}
=1
=∗,w h e r e∗ solves relation (8) given the
aggregate loan supply (A5) and demand (A6), ∗ ∈ ( − ),a n d∗  1.
The equilibrium is represented in ﬁgure A2 by point  as the intersection of the aggregate
demand and supply curves. Since for the equilibrium market return some bankers 1 are
willing to borrow, the ﬁnancial intermediation process is less eﬃcient than in the frictionless
economy (point FB). The intuition goes as follows. For the frictionless equilibrium rate (i.e. for
 = ) the leverage of banker  =1is now constrained due to the fact that even this banker is
unable to commit not to run away. Since at this interest rate banker  =1is the only borrower
on the market, and by virtue of atomicity, aggregate demand is inﬁnitesimal. Consequently, the
equilibrium requires a lower borrowing rate (i.e. that for some  6 1: ()  ). At such a
lower rate, however, some less skillful bankers are willing to borrow, which reduces the overall
eﬃciency of the pool of borrowers. The resulting equilibrium  is a second best equilibrium in
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Figure A2: Financial market supply and demand - Perfect information
with  =2 5 ;  =0 7
The impact of productivity on the equilibrium is straightforward. Following a rise in  the
opportunity cost of cash diversion increases and the moral hazard problem softens: not only are
more bankers willing to become borrowers in this case (()  0), but also borrowers
are able to leverage more (  0). Both the equilibrium market return ∗ and (for a given
borrower ) market rate ∗ () increase so that the market clears.
7.3 Derivation of Relation (5)
Using relation (3) I substitute  into relation (2), which yields
 =

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⇔ 2 +(  +  − 2) −  =0 
7.4 Proof of Proposition 1
7.4.1 Condition of Existence of +






is equivalent to (using (5)): 
 =
2+1
(1−2).I d e ﬁne () ≡
2+1
(1−2) so that () > () ⇔
 () 6 
 . The function () is convex and reaches a minimum in  ≡
p√
5 − 2 ' 049,a s
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Wholesale ﬁnancial market equilibrium Existence and uniqueness of + and −
If it exists, equilibrium + is characterized by the market return ∗





relation (5)) where ∗






that is above  (the other root,



















 ' 333 (A7)
with ()
0  0. It remains to check that ∗
+  1 in this case, i.e. that the storage technology

















+  1 − . Since by construction ∗
+ > , two cases must be discussed. First, if
 > 1− ⇔  >  ≡ 1−,t h e n∗
+  1− and + exists ∀ > (). Second, if   1−
then
∗





 1 −  ⇔ 
2 − 2 + 2






By construction () is the very productivity level for which ∗









⇔ (1) = (1+) ⇔ ∗
+ =1 , and it is easy to check from (A7) and (A8)41
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that 
0 ()  0, lim&0 ()=1 , () > 1, () () ∀ ∈ (01]Á{},a n d()=().
It follows that + exists if and only if
b () ≡
(
() for  6 
() for  > 
 (A9)
where () and () are deﬁn e di n( A 7 )a n d( A 8 ) , b 0 ()  0, lim&0 b ()=l i m &0 ()=1 ,
and
 ≡ 1 −
q√
5 − 2 ' 051 (A10)
Note that lim&0 b ()=1implies that + always exists and is unique when there is no moral
hazard (given assumption 1). In this case, + converges toward the ﬁr s tb e s ta l l o c a t i o n
described in appendix 7.2.1: ∗
+ → +∞ and the market clears only when ∗
+ = ∗
+ = .
7.4.2 Condition of Existence of −
From (6), (7) and (8), I know that − exists if and only if (1) 6 (1+).S i n c e(1+) 6 0
and (1) > 0,a n d() is (by construction) the productivity level for which (1) = (1+),
− exists if and only if  6 ().
7.5 Equilibrium Stability
The Walrasian tatonnement process described in deﬁnition A1 below can be thought of as a
tentative trial-and-error process taking place in ﬁctional time (), starting with an initial ﬁctive
price that is not an equilibrium price, and run by an abstract agent (the Walrasian auctioneer)
bent on ﬁnding this equilibrium price, or bent on restoring equilibrium after a random distur-
bance. Figure A5 below depicts the excess demand on the wholesale ﬁnancial market for the
s a m ep a r a m e t e r sa si nﬁgure 1. It shows that point  can be eliminated as unstable equilibrium.
Deﬁnition A1 (Tatonnement Stability): An equilibrium (∗ ∗) is (locally) stable if, when-
ever the initial market return (0) is suﬃciently close to ∗, the dynamic adjustment driven by
the tatonnement process: () = (()) −  (()) causes the market return to converge to
























Figure A5: Tatonnement trajectories
with  =2 5 ;  =0 742
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7.6 Proof of Proposition 2
Point (i): ∗
− 6 ∗
+ comes from the fact ∗
+ > ∗











comes directly from relation (3), the result 0 () > 0,a n d∗
+ > ∗
−.




 (1 − )
(1 + )
 (A11)













−, one gets ∗
+ 6 ∗
−.
7.7 Proof of Proposition 3
Point (i): One has
∗
+
 > 0 (see ﬁgure A1) and therefore (using (5))
∗
+
 > 0 and (using (4))
∗
+
 > 0. Similarly, one has
∗
+
 6 0 (see ﬁgure A1) and (from (5))

 6 0 and





 6 0 and (using (4))
∗
+
 6 0.P o i n t ( i i ) :
∗
−
 =0comes from relation
(4) and ∗
− =1 ,w h i l e
∗
−
 6 0 comes from (1) 6 0 (from (5)). Similarly, one has:
∗
−
 6 0 comes from relation (4) and ∗
− =1 ,w h i l e
∗
−
 > 0 comes from (1) 6 0
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